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EXTENDING POSITIVE IDENTIFICATION FROM PERSONS TO PLACES:
TERRORISM, ARMED CONFLICT, AND THE IDENTIFICATION OF
MILITARY OBJECTIVES
Laurie R. Blank*
In January 2013, French forces combating rebel forces in Mali attacked
“Islamic targets” in northern Mali and French fighter planes “hit rebel targets in
the northern cities of Gao and Kidal.” 1 Turkish forces frequently attack “rebel
positions,” fighting the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) in Iraq’s Kurdistan
region, 2 and the Sri Lankan Army targeted “terrorist stronghold[s]” during the
conflict with the Tamil Tigers. 3 The Israel Defense Forces contend with “rocket
villages” in Hezbollah-dominated areas in southern Lebanon and with the
complexities of a periodically intensifying conflict with a terrorist entity governing
the Gaza Strip. 4 In Afghanistan, U.S. and multinational forces seek not only to
target Taliban and al-Qaeda operatives, but also to disable and destroy the
infrastructure that enables them to continue launching and threatening attacks
against the Afghan government and multinational forces. 5
Conflicts between States and non-state actors are certainly not a new
phenomenon, but over the past decade or more, the legal issues they highlight have
dominated the academic and policy discourse. With regard to targeting, these
debates have focused almost entirely on who can be targeted—attacked—in the
course of an armed conflict with a non-state entity, in accordance with the law of
armed conflict. To be sure, identifying individuals who are legitimate targets in
* © 2013 Laurie R. Blank. Director, International Humanitarian Law Clinic, Emory
University School of Law. I am grateful to Tariq Mohideen for his excellent research
assistance in preparation of this Article.
1
George Thomas, French Military Pounds Islamic Targets in Mali, CBN NEWS (Jan.
18, 2013), http://www.cbn.com/cbnnews/world/2013/January/French-Military-PoundsIslamist-Targets-in-Mali.
2
Turkey Defends Incursions in Iraq, BBC NEWS (Dec. 19, 2007, 12:23 AM),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/7151074.stm.
3
Sri Lankan Military Targets LTTE in North, UPI.COM (Oct. 13, 2008, 2:00 PM),
http://www.upi.com/Emerging_Threats/2008/10/13/Sri-Lankan-military-targets-LTTE-innorth/UPI-47791223920808.
4
Israeli Map Shows Nearly 1,000 Hezbollah Sites, AL ARABIYA NEWS (Mar. 31,
2011, 2:48 PM), http://www.alarabiya.net/articles/2011/03/31/143666.html.
5
See George Friedman, Strategic Divergence: The War Against the Taliban and the
War Against Al Qaeda, STRATFOR GLOBAL INTELLIGENCE (Jan. 26, 2009, 1:01 PM), http://
www.stratfor.com/weekly/20090126_strategic_divergence_war_against_taliban_and_war_
against_al_qaeda; Henry Kissinger, A Strategy for Afghanistan, WASH. POST (Feb. 26,
2009), http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2009-02-26/opinions/36927848_1_afghan-pakist
ani-afghan-population-military-strategy; NATO Pursues New Strategy for Afghan
Insurgency, VOICE OF AM. (Feb. 10, 2010, 7:00 PM), http://www.voanews.com/content/
nato-pursues-new-strategy-for-countering-afghan-insurgency-84179592/165352.html.
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non-international armed conflict is challenging, made particularly so by the
common practice of non-state actors purposely mingling with the civilian
population. 6 The erosion of the distinction between fighter and civilian during
armed conflict, most notably in conflicts with organized armed groups, terrorist
groups, and other non-state entities, is a primary cause for the continued and
increased danger for civilians during wartime, and also lies at the heart of many
challenging implementation issues for state armed forces.7 The current debate over
the United States’ program of targeted strikes by armed drones centers on precisely
this question, for example: Who can be targeted in the course of a conflict with a
transnational non-state entity, and how should such persons be identified? 8
These issues and questions continue to be of great importance. However,
military operations in armed conflict are not limited simply to actions taken against
individuals and groups or units of persons fighting. All manner of objects—
buildings, equipment, roadways, bridges, communications networks, airfields,
strategic locations, and more—are also vital components of military operations and
can be legitimate targets of attack during conflict. Unlike in the area of
categorization of persons, where the difference between international armed
conflict and non-international armed conflict is significant in providing for
combatant status and prisoner of war protections in the former category of conflict
only, the law makes no distinction between the two types of conflict in addressing
the types of objects that can be attacked or must be protected. 9 Nonetheless, the
nature of conflicts with non-state actors—which encompasses more than one type
of non-international armed conflict—introduces a number of issues specific to
targeting of objects in such conflicts.
This Article addresses the identification of military objectives in a variety of
non-international armed conflict contexts, including conflicts with terrorist groups
operating transnationally and conflicts with non-state actors located outside the
State’s borders. In particular, the nature of non-international armed conflict can
6

Ann Scott Tyson, In Afghanistan, A Test of Tactics, WASH. POST, Aug. 13, 2009, at
A6, available at http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2009-08-13/world/36785580_1_helm
and-river-anibal-paz-taliban-fighters.
7
See, e.g., Laurie R. Blank, Taking Distinction to the Next Level: Accountability for
Fighters’ Failure to Distinguish Themselves from Civilians, 46 VAL. U. L. REV. 765 (2012)
(discussing how the failure of fighters to distinguish themselves from innocent civilians
undermines the law’s protection of innocent civilians).
8
See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, LAWFULNESS OF A LETHAL OPERATION DIRECTED
AGAINST A U.S. CITIZEN WHO IS A SENIOR OPERATIONAL LEADER OF AL-QA’IDA OR AN
ASSOCIATED FORCE (2013), available at http://msnbcmedia.msn.com/i/msnbc/sections/
news/020413_DOJ_White_Paper.pdf; Michael Isikoff, Justice Department Memo Reveals
Legal Case for Drone Strikes on Americans, NBCNEWS.COM (Feb. 4, 2013, 8:57 PM),
http://openchannel.nbcnews.com/_news/2013/02/04/16843014-justice-department-memo-r
eveals-legal-case-for-drone-strikes-on-americans?lite.
9
1 JEAN-MARIE HENCKAERTS & LOUISE DOSWALD-BECK, CUSTOMARY
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 29–32 (2005) (noting that the definition of military
objectives is applicable as customary international law in both international and noninternational armed conflicts).
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alter how the basic definition and analysis of the term “military objective” is
applied. For example, the same types of objects that would automatically be
considered military in nature in an international armed conflict—a conflict
between two States—would not necessarily suggest the same military connotation
in a non-international armed conflict. Another comprehensive analytical challenge
lies in the fact that nearly every object in a non-international armed conflict will
fall into the category of dual-use objects; very few will be objectively and solely
military and, unfortunately, all too often very few objects will retain a solely
civilian use.
Operationally, state armed forces fighting against a non-state actor, whether
an insurgent group inside its borders, a non-state entity in a neighboring State, or a
transnational terrorist group, need to make the same determinations about lawful
targets as in any other conflict, international or non-international. In this sense, the
fact that those state forces are combating a non-state actor does not change either
the definition of military objective or the practical, operational task of identifying
lawful objectives and applying targeting doctrine and the law of armed conflict to
that process to ensure lawful military operations in all circumstances. However, the
challenges of conflicts with non-state actors introduce a range of questions
regarding how the definitional components of military objective should be
understood and applied. With regard to two of the core purposes of the law of
armed conflict, exploring and understanding the import of these questions and how
they play out in practice is essential. First, protection of civilians: distinguishing
between military and civilian objects is perhaps the fundamental aspect of how the
law of armed conflict regulates the conduct of hostilities so as to minimize civilian
suffering and harm during war. 10 Second, enabling effective military operations:
the law of armed conflict is not designed to prevent war, nor was it envisioned as a
set of constraints that would make it impractical to engage in combat, thereby
leaving States with no effective options to fulfill their core mission of protecting
national security and their own citizens from danger. 11 Rather, the law is inherently
practical; it is meant to facilitate the lawful and effective fulfillment of military
operations. To the extent that the application of the definition of military objectives
in non-international armed conflicts introduces complications and conceptual
challenges that blur the lines between civilian and military, and exacerbate existing
difficulties, it is important to tease out and better understand those conceptual
challenges.
Part I of this Article sets forth the framework for targeting within the law of
armed conflict, including the key principles of the law that govern targeting, both
the choice of target and the means and methods used to apply combat force to that
target. In addition, Part I highlights the basic challenges of positive identification
10

CLAUDE PILLOUD ET AL., INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, COMMENTARY ON THE
ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS OF 8 JUNE 1977 TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST
1949, at 630 (Yves Sandoz et al., 1987).
11
See LAURIE R. BLANK & GREGORY P. NOONE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ARMED
CONFLICT: FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES AND CONTEMPORARY CHALLENGES IN THE LAW OF
WAR 10–11 (2013).

1230

UTAH LAW REVIEW

[NO. 5

that are particularly relevant in, although not limited to, non-international armed
conflict. Part II analyzes the definition of military objective, including the
historical background to the concept of military objective and how the existing
definition has developed and applies in current conflicts. Finally, Part III analyzes
in depth how conflicts with non-state actors pose difficulties for the application of
the definition of military objective to potential targets, in effect extending the
ongoing conversation regarding positive identification of persons to the
identification of objects as well. In particular, Part III addresses the question of
which objects are inherently military in nature in such conflicts, whether dual-use
extends to nearly all objects because of the nature of how non-state armed groups
function within the civilian population, and how use and purpose may need to be
reconceptualized in light of how non-state armed groups operate. Throughout, the
analysis also identifies areas for further analysis and potential future concerns with
regard to interpretation and application of the law of armed conflict.
I. FOUNDATIONS: TARGETING AND THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT
The law of armed conflict (LOAC), otherwise known as international
humanitarian law (IHL) or the law of war, governs the conduct of both States and
individuals during armed conflict and seeks to minimize suffering in war by
protecting persons not participating in hostilities and by restricting the means and
methods of warfare. 12 LOAC applies during all situations of armed conflict, with
the full panoply of the Geneva Conventions and customary law applicable in
international armed conflict and a more limited body of treaty-based and
customary law applicable during non-international armed conflict. The 1949
Geneva Conventions endeavor to address all instances of armed conflict 13 and set
12

See War and International Humanitarian Law, INT’L COMM. RED CROSS (Oct. 29,
2010), http://www.icrc.org/eng/war-and-law/overview-war-and-law.htm. The law of armed
conflict is set forth primarily in the four Geneva Conventions of August 14, 1949 and their
Additional Protocols. See Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August
1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol
I), opened for signature Dec. 12, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Additional Protocol
I]; Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the
Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), opened for
signature Dec. 10, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609 [hereinafter Additional Protocol II]; Geneva
Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed
Forces in the Field, opened for signature Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31;
Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and
Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, opened for signature Aug. 12, 1949, 6
U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85; Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of
War, opened for signature Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter
Geneva Convention III]; Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons
in Time of War, opened for signature Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S 287
[hereinafter Geneva Convention IV].
13
OSCAR M. UHLER ET AL., INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, COMMENTARY: IV
GENEVA CONVENTION RELATIVE TO THE PROTECTION OF CIVILIAN PERSONS IN TIME OF
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forth two primary categories of armed conflict that trigger the application of
LOAC: international armed conflict and non-international armed conflict.
Common Article 2 of the Geneva Conventions of August 1949 states that the
Conventions “shall apply to all cases of declared war or of any other armed
conflict which may arise between two or more of the High Contracting Parties,
even if the state of war is not recognized by one of them.” 14 Common Article 3 of
the Geneva Conventions of August 1949 sets forth minimum provisions applicable
“in the case of armed conflict not of an international character occurring in the
territory of one of the High Contracting Parties.” 15
Just as the existence of an armed conflict triggers the application of LOAC to
govern the status of persons and the rights and obligations of parties to the conflict,
the nature of the conflict—whether international or non-international—determines
the extent of the applicable law. International armed conflicts are subject to the full
panoply of the Geneva Conventions and the customary laws of war. 16 Noninternational armed conflicts are subject to the more limited legal regime of
Common Article 3 and the steadily growing customary international law applicable
in non-international armed conflict, including the principles of military necessity,
humanity, distinction, and proportionality. 17 Over the past several decades, the law

WAR 26 (Jean S. Pictet ed., Ronald Griffin & C.W. Dumbleton trans., 1958) (“Born on the
battlefield, the Red Cross called into being the First Geneva Convention to protect
wounded and sick military personnel. Extending its solicitude little by little to other
categories of war victims, in logical application of its fundamental principle, it pointed the
way, first to the revision of the original Convention, and then to the extension of legal
protection in turn to prisoners of war and civilians. The same logical process could not fail
to lead to the idea of applying the principle to all cases of armed conflict, including internal
ones.”).
14
Geneva Convention III, supra note 12, art. 2; Geneva Convention IV, supra note
12, art. 2.
15
Geneva Convention III, supra note 12, art. 3; Geneva Convention IV, supra note
12, art. 3.
16
See supra text accompanying note 14; Geoffrey S. Corn, What Law Applies to the
War on Terror?, in THE WAR ON TERROR AND THE LAWS OF WAR: A MILITARY
PERSPECTIVE 1, 15 (Michael W. Lewis ed., 2009).
17
Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Decision on Defence Motion for
Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, ¶¶ 100–27 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former
Yugoslavia Oct 2, 1995) (highlighting the development and applicability of necessity,
distinction, humanity, and proportionality to internal armed conflict); LINDSAY MOIR, THE
LAW OF INTERNAL ARMED CONFLICT 133–34 (2002); Geoffrey S. Corn & Eric Talbot
Jensen, Untying the Gordian Knot: A Proposal for Determining Applicability of the Laws
of War to the War on Terror, 81 TEMP. L. REV. 788, 827 (2008); Christopher Greenwood,
International Humanitarian Law and the Tadic Case, 7 EUR. J. INT’L L. 265, 275–78
(1996); see Abella v. Argentina, Case 11.137, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 55/97,
OEA/Ser.L/V/II.95, doc. 6 rev. ¶¶ 176–77 (1997); Ian G. Corey, The Fine Line Between
Policy and Custom: Prosecutor v. Tadic and the Customary International Law of Internal
Armed Conflict, 166 MIL. L. REV. 145, 152–53 (2000); Anthony Cullen, Key Developments
Affecting the Scope of Internal Armed Conflict in International Humanitarian Law, 183
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applicable in international armed conflict and that applicable in non-international
armed conflict has continued to merge, until in many aspects of the law, the legal
obligations and principles are nearly identical. 18 One area where sharp distinctions
remain is the status of persons: unlike international armed conflict, where LOAC
recognizes the particular status of combatant, in non-international armed conflict,
LOAC does not create status categories at all. 19 However, for the purposes of this
Article, which focuses on targeting and, in particular, the identification of military
objectives, the law applicable in both international and non-international armed
conflicts is based on the same central principles and obligations.
A. Key Principles of Targeting
The lawfulness of targeting individuals and objects during armed conflict is
determined by the principles of distinction, proportionality, and precautions. As a
foundation for the discussion to follow, this section offers a brief background on
these key components of the law of targeting.
One of the most fundamental issues during conflict is identifying who or what
can be targeted. The principle of distinction, one of the “cardinal principles” of the
LOAC, 20 requires that any party to a conflict distinguish between those who are
fighting and those who are not and to direct attacks solely at the former. Similarly,
parties must distinguish between civilian objects and military objects and target
only the latter. Article 48 of Additional Protocol I thus sets forth the basic rule: “In
order to ensure respect for and protection of the civilian population and civilian
objects, the Parties to the conflict shall at all times distinguish between the civilian
population and combatants and between civilian objects and military objectives
and accordingly shall direct their operations only against military objectives.” 21
Distinction lies at the core of the LOAC’s seminal goal of protecting innocent
civilians and persons who are hors de combat. The obligation to distinguish is part
of the customary international law of both international and non-international
armed conflicts, as the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia
(“ICTY”) held in the Tadić case. 22 The purpose of distinction—to protect
MIL. L. REV. 65, 66 (2005); William A. Schabas, Punishment of Non-State Actors in NonInternational Armed Conflict, 26 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 907, 915–17 (2003).
18
Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-T, ¶¶ 96–127; EVE LA HAYE, WAR CRIMES IN INTERNAL
CONFLICTS 380 (2010) (discussing the overlap between the laws of war applicable in
internal and international armed conflict).
19
Michael N. Schmitt, The Status of Opposition Fighters in a Non-International
Armed Conflict, 88 INT’L LAW STUD. 119, 119–20 (2012).
20
Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J.
226, ¶ 78 (July 8) (declaring that distinction and the prohibition on unnecessary suffering
are the two cardinal principles of international humanitarian law).
21
Additional Protocol I, supra note 12, art. 48. Article 48 is considered customary
international law. See 1 HENCKAERTS & DOSWALD-BECK, supra note 9, at 3–8.
22
Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-T, ¶ 111 (“Bearing in mind the need for measures to
ensure the better protection of human rights in armed conflicts of all types, [. . . the General
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civilians—is emphasized in Article 51 of Additional Protocol I, which states that
“[t]he civilian population as such, as well as individual civilians, shall not be the
object of attack.” 23 Furthermore, Article 85 of Additional Protocol I declares that
nearly all violations of distinction constitute grave breaches of the Protocol, 24 and
the Rome Statute similarly criminalizes attacks on civilians and indiscriminate
attacks. 25
Distinction thus requires identification of lawful targets as a prerequisite to
the use of force in armed conflict. A lawful attack must be directed at a legitimate
target: either a combatant, a member of an organized armed group, a civilian
directly participating in hostilities, or a military objective. In international armed
conflicts—those occurring between States—all members of the State’s regular
armed forces are combatants and can be identified by the uniform they wear,
among other characteristics. Other persons falling within the category of
combatant include members of volunteer militia who meet four requirements:
operating under responsible command, wearing a distinctive emblem, carrying
arms openly, and abiding by the law of armed conflict. 26 Members of the regular
armed forces of a government not recognized by the opposing party and civilians
participating in a levée en masse also qualify as combatants in international armed
conflict. 27 Combatants can be attacked at all times and enjoy no immunity from
attack, except when they are hors de combat due to sickness, wounds, or capture.
In non-international armed conflicts, including State versus non-state actor
conflicts, there is no combatant status, but individuals who are members of an
organized armed group are legitimate targets of attack at all times. 28 The principle
Assembly] Affirms the following basic principles for the protection of civilian populations
in armed conflicts, without prejudice to their future elaboration within the framework of
progressive development of the international law of armed conflict: . . . [i]n the conduct of
military operations during armed conflicts, a distinction must be made at all times between
persons actively taking part in the hostilities and civilian populations.” (first alteration in
original) (quoting G.A. Res. 2675 (XXV), U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp. No. 28, U.N.
Doc. A/8028 (Dec. 9, 1970) (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Legality of the
Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 1996 I.C.J. 226, ¶ 79 (stating that distinction is one of
the “intransgressible principles of international customary law”); Abella, Report No. 55/97
at ¶¶ 177–78 (“[C]ustomary law principles applicable to all armed conflicts require the
contending parties to refrain from directly attacking the civilian population and individual
civilians and to distinguish in their targeting between civilians and combatants and other
lawful military objectives.”); 1 HENCKAERTS & DOSWALD-BECK, supra note 9, at 3–8
(discussing the distinction between civilians and combatants).
23
Additional Protocol I, supra note 12, art. 51(2).
24
Id. art. 85(3).
25
See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 8, para. 2(b)(i)–(ii), (iv)–
(vi), (e)(i)–(ii), (iv), opened for signature July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 3.
26
Geneva Convention III, supra note 12, art. 4(A)(2).
27
Id. art. 4(A)(3), (6).
28
See JIMMY GURULÉ & GEOFFREY S. CORN, PRINCIPLES OF COUNTER-TERRORISM
LAW 70–76 (2011) (discussing the rules governing targeting of enemy forces in
international and non-international armed conflict and noting that (1) “a member of an
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of distinction and concomitant obligations apply with equal force to attacks on
objects rather than persons; indeed, the obligation to target only military objectives
lies at the heart of this Article’s analysis of how the identification of military
objectives is affected by the nature of conflict with non-state actors.
The second key principle, the principle of proportionality, requires that parties
refrain from attacks in which the expected civilian casualties will be excessive in
relation to the anticipated military advantage gained. 29 This principle balances
military necessity and humanity, and is based on the confluence of two key ideas.
First, the means and methods of attacking the enemy are not unlimited. Rather, the
only legitimate object of war is to weaken the military forces of the enemy. 30
Second, the legal proscription on targeting civilians does not extend to a complete
prohibition on all civilian deaths. The law has always tolerated “[t]he incidence of
some civilian casualties . . . as a consequence of military action,”31 although “even
a legitimate target may not be attacked if the collateral civilian casualties would be
disproportionate to the specific military gain from the attack.” 32 That is, the law
requires that military commanders and decision makers assess the advantage to be
gained from an attack in light of the likely civilian casualties. 33
Additional Protocol I contains three separate statements of the principle of
proportionality. The first appears in Article 51, which sets forth the basic
parameters of the obligation to protect civilians and the civilian population, and
prohibits any “attack which may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian
life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which
would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage
anticipated.” 34 This language demonstrates that Additional Protocol I contemplates

enemy force . . . is presumed hostile and therefore presumptively subject to attack” in
international armed conflict and (2) “[s]ubjecting members of organized belligerent groups
to status based targeting pursuant to the LOAC as opposed to civilians who periodically
lose their protection from attack seems both logical and consistent with the practice of
[S]tates engaged in non-international armed conflicts”); INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS,
INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE ON THE NOTION OF DIRECT PARTICIPATION IN HOSTILITIES 27–29
(2009) (stating that organized armed groups are targetable based on status in noninternational armed conflict).
29
Additional Protocol I, supra note 12, art. 51(5)(b).
30
Hague Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land and Its
Annex: Regulations Concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land, art 22, Oct. 18,
1907.
31
Judith Gardam, Necessity and Proportionality in Jus Ad Bellum and Jus In Bello,
in INTERNATIONAL LAW, THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS
275, 283–84 (Laurence Boisson de Chazournes & Philippe Sands eds., 1999).
32
Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J.
226, 587 (July 8) (dissenting opinion of Judge Higgins).
33
The term “collateral damage” is often used in the media and by the public to refer
to the incidental (meaning not deliberate) civilian casualties from an attack on a military
target.
34
Additional Protocol I, supra note 12, art. 51(5)(b).
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incidental civilian casualties, and appears again in Articles 57(2)(a)(iii) 35 and
57(2)(b), 36 which refer specifically to precautions in attack. Proportionality is not a
mathematical concept, but rather a guideline to help ensure that military
commanders weigh the consequences of a particular attack and refrain from
launching attacks that will cause excessive civilian deaths. The principle of
proportionality is well accepted as an element of customary international law
applicable in all armed conflicts. 37
Lastly, LOAC mandates that all parties take certain precautionary measures to
protect civilians. In many ways, the identification of military objectives and the
proportionality considerations are, of course, precautions. But the obligations of
the parties to a conflict to take precautionary measures go beyond that. Beginning
at the broadest level, Article 57(1) of Additional Protocol I states, “In the conduct
of military operations, constant care shall be taken to spare the civilian population,
civilians and civilian objects.” 38 This provision is a direct outgrowth of and
supplement to the Basic Rule in Article 48, which mandates that all parties
distinguish between combatants and civilians and between military objects and
civilian objects. 39 The practical provisions forming the major portion of Article 57
discuss precautions to be taken specifically when launching an attack. Precautions
are, understandably, a critical component of the law’s efforts to protect civilians
and are of particular importance in densely populated areas or areas where civilians
are at risk from the consequences of military operations. For this reason, even if a
target is legitimate under the laws of war, failure to take precautions can make an
attack on that target unlawful.
First, parties must do everything feasible to ensure that targets are military
objectives. 40 Doing so helps to protect civilians by limiting attacks to military
targets, thus directly implementing the principle of distinction. Second, they must
choose the means and methods of attack with the aim of minimizing incidental
35

Id. art. 57(2)(a)(iii) (“With respect to attacks, the following precautions shall be
taken: [t]hose who plan or decide upon an attack shall . . . [r]efrain from deciding to launch
any attack which may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to
civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in
relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated.”).
36
Id. art. 57(2)(b) (“An attack shall be cancelled or suspended if it becomes apparent
that the objective is not a military one or is subject to special protection or that the attack
may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to
civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the
concrete and direct military advantage anticipated.”).
37
Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 1996 I.C.J. at 587 (dissenting
opinion of Judge Higgins); YORAM DINSTEIN, THE CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES UNDER THE
LAW OF INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT 120 (2004); 1 HENCKAERTS & DOSWALDBECK, supra note 9, at 46; Michael N. Schmitt, Fault Lines in the Law of Attack, in
TESTING THE BOUNDARIES OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 277, 292 (Susan
Breau & Agnieszka Jachec-Neale eds., 2006).
38
Additional Protocol I, supra note 12, art. 57(1).
39
Id. art. 48.
40
Id. art. 57(2)(a)(i).
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civilian losses and damage. 41 For example, during the 1991 Persian Gulf War,
“pilots were advised to attack bridges in urban areas along a longitudinal axis. This
measure was taken so that bombs that missed their targets—because they were
dropped either too early or too late—would hopefully fall in the river and not on
civilian housing.” 42 Another common method of taking precautions is to launch
attacks on particular targets at night when the civilian population is not on the
streets or at work, thus minimizing potential losses. 43 In addition, when choosing
between two possible attacks offering similar military advantage, parties must
choose the objective that offers the least likely harm to civilians and civilian
objects. 44 Each of these steps requires an attacking party to take affirmative action
to preserve civilian immunity and minimize civilian casualties and damage—in
effect, to take “constant care.” 45 Proportionality considerations are also a major
component of the precautions framework. Parties are required to refrain from any
attacks that would be disproportionate and to cancel any attacks where it becomes
evident that the civilian losses would be excessive in light of the military
advantage. 46 Finally, Article 57(2)(c) of Additional Protocol I requires attacking
parties to issue an effective advance warning of “attacks which may affect the
civilian population, unless circumstances do not permit.” 47
These key principles of LOAC form the essential guideposts for targeting in
armed conflict, whether against persons or objects. With regard to the targeting of
objects, only objects that meet the definition of military objective constitute
legitimate targets of attack, as required by the principle of distinction; once such
determination is made, the obligations introduced by the principles of
proportionality and precautions must be fulfilled as well. The obligation to target
only military objectives is one way of implementing the age-old principle that the
means and methods of warfare are not unlimited. 48 Part II below sets forth the
41

Id. art. 57(2)(a)(ii).
Jean-François Quéguiner, Precautions Under the Law Governing the Conduct of
Hostilities, 88 INT’L REV. RED CROSS, 793, 801 (2006). This angle of attack “also means
that damage would tend to be in the middle of the bridge and thus easier to repair.” Id. at
801 n.27.
43
See id. at 800 (noting that U.S. forces in Iraq conducted offensive operations at
night in an effort to minimize civilian casualties).
44
Additional Protocol I, supra note 12, art. 57(3).
45
Id. art. 57(1).
46
Id. art. 57(2)(a)(iii), (b).
47
Id. art. 57(2)(c).
48
The modern version of this principle appears in Article 35 of Additional Protocol I;
earlier formulations appear in the writings of Vitoria, Grotius and Vattel, as well as in early
codifications of the laws of war. See generally The Laws of War on Land art. 4, Sept. 9,
1880, reprinted in THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICTS 29 (Dietrich Schindler & Jiri Toman
eds., 4th rev. & completed ed. 2004); Declaration Renouncing the Use in Time of War of
Explosive Projectiles Under 400 Grammes Weight, Dec. 11, 1868, 138 Consol. T.S. 297; 3
HUGO GROTIUS, THE LAW OF WAR AND PEACE (George Grafton Wilson ed., Francis W.
Kelsey trans., Oceana Publ’ns 1964) (1646); EMMERICH DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS
OR THE PRINCIPLES OF NATURAL LAW APPLIED TO THE CONDUCT AND AFFAIRS OF NATIONS
42
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definition of military objective and the parameters for implementing the decision
during military operations.
B. Challenges of Positive Identification in Non-International Armed Conflicts
Thousands of pages have been written over the past decade and more about
the complexities of contemporary conflicts, where the lack of boundaries between
conflict areas and civilian areas—between those actively participating in hostilities
and those who are not—pose particular challenges for distinction. Without going
into great detail or addressing the complexities of this issue, this sub-section
simply offers a brief glimpse at how these complex conflicts, where the lines
between innocent civilian and fighter are barely distinguishable, impact the
obligation of distinction and the need to ensure positive identification of targets.
These situations demand ever-greater efforts—through intelligence-gathering and
surveillance—to determine who is whom, and what is what, in the zone of combat
operations. In addition, modern warfare is increasingly characterized by
asymmetry in the military capabilities of the parties, which adds to these
difficulties. As such asymmetry grows, the “disadvantaged party has an incentive
to blur the distinction between its forces and the civilian population in the hope
that this will deter the other side from attack.” 49
When hostile persons (members of armed groups or civilians directly
participating in hostilities, for example) fail to wear uniforms or carry their arms
openly, differentiating between legitimate targets and innocent civilians is
extraordinarily difficult and fraught with danger for both the soldier and the
innocent civilian. Insurgents take advantage of this dilemma every day to gain an
edge over the superior military capabilities and resources of state forces. During
Operation Iraqi Freedom, for example, Iraqi insurgents commonly wore civilian
clothing when approaching American and British forces in order to get closer
without seeming to present a threat. 50 Perhaps most nefariously, insurgent groups
that employ suicide bombing as a tactic have now turned to the use of women and
children, for they have proven more likely to evade measures designed to identify
SOVEREIGNS (Neill H. Alford, Jr. ed., Charles G. Fenwick trans., Carnegie Inst. of
Wash. 1916) (1758); FRANCIS LIEBER, INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF ARMIES
OF THE UNITED STATES IN THE FIELD art. 16 (Wash., Gov’t Printing Office 1898)
[hereinafter THE LIEBER CODE], reprinted in THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICTS, supra, at 3;
FRANCISCUS DE VICTORIA, DE INDIS ET DE IVRE BELLI RELECTIONES (Ernest Nys ed., John
Pawley Bate trans., Ocean Publ’ns 1964) (1557).
49
Michael N. Schmitt, The Impact of High and Low-Tech Warfare on the Principle of
Distinction, in INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW AND THE 21ST CENTURY’S
CONFLICTS: CHANGES AND CHALLENGES 169, 178 (Roberta Arnold & Pierre-Antoine
Hildbrand eds., 2005); see also id. at 170 (recognizing a “widening divide between States
that posses [sic] high-tech military capabilities and those that do not”).
50
Id.; see also Official: Afghan Militants Fled Dressed as Women, CNN.COM (July 6,
2009, 4:30 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2009/WORLD/asiapcf/07/06/afghanistan.marine.stan
doff/index.html.
AND
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suicide bombers. 51 In Sri Lanka, the Tamil Tigers purposely blended in with the
civilian population, sought shelter in the safe zones established to provide fire-free
areas for civilian protection, and used civilians as human shields in the face of
extensive government shelling. 52 There is, unfortunately, no end to the examples
available of fighters using the cover of the civilian population (as a shield, as a
disguise, or in other ways) to gain an advantage over the other side.
These challenges are not limited to the identification of enemy persons,
however, but extend to the identification of buildings and other objects that are part
of or contribute to enemy operations. Thus, in conflicts between Israel and Hamas,
for example, Hamas has used hospitals, schools, mosques, residential houses, and
other civilian objects extensively for the storage of weapons, firing of rockets, and
other military purposes. 53 In fact, Hamas does not have a “war ministry” or many
other identifiable military locations—because it deliberately commingles military
and civilian buildings and objects. Conflicts in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Lebanon,
among others, also involved similar use of protected objects by insurgents and
other fighters. 54 Human rights organizations regularly condemned the Iraqi
51

See, e.g., Dan Abrams, Turning a Blind Eye to Child Suicide Bombers,
NBCNEWS.COM (March 26, 2004, 11:37:21 AM), http://www.nbcnews.com/id/4601244#.
UWHSZaLYc9U (discussing several incidences of child suicide bombings); Child
Bombers-in-Training Arrested in Iraq, UPI.COM (April 21, 2009, 11:14 AM), http://www.u
pi.com/Top_News/2009/04/21/Child-bombers-in-training-arrested-in-Iraq/UPI-487612403
26883 (discussing the arrest in Iraq of four children being trained to engage in suicide
bombings); Cassandra Clifford, The Battle for Child Suicide Bombers, FOREIGN POL’Y
BLOGS NETWORK (Aug. 4, 2009), http://foreignpolicyblogs.com/2009/08/04/the-battle-forchild-suicide-bombers (explaining that children are used as suicide bombers because “they
are easy to manipulate and influence, [and] children are still seen as the least likely suspect
and thus less likely to be arrested, making them more effective than their adult
counterparts”); Nic Robertson, Pakistan: Taliban Buying Children for Suicide Attacks,
CNN.COM (July 7, 2009, 5:36 AM), http://edition.cnn.com/2009/WORLD/asiapcf/07/07/pa
kistan.child.bombers/index.html (explaining that “young suicide bombers may be able to
reach targets unnoticed”).
52
Sri Lanka: UN Says Army Shelling Killed Civilians, BBC (Apr. 26, 2011),
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-south-asia-13190576.
53
See ANTHONY H. CORDESMAN, CTR. FOR STRATEGIC & INT’L STUDIES, THE “GAZA
WAR”: A STRATEGIC ANALYSIS 43–47, 49, 51–52, 54–55 (2009), available at http://csis.or
g/files/media/csis/pubs/090202_gaza_war.pdf (describing how Hamas uses mosques,
houses and cemeteries for military operations and to store weapons).
54
See U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations, Letter dated Mar. 5,
1991 from the Permanent Representative addressed to the President of the Security Council,
U.N. Doc. S/22341 (Mar. 8, 1991) (explaining that the Iraqis “moved significant amounts
of military weapons and equipment into civilian areas with the deliberate purpose of using
innocent civilians and their homes as shields against attacks on legitimate military targets”
and “Iraqi fighter and bomber aircraft were dispersed into villages near military airfields
where they were parked between civilian houses and even placed immediately adjacent to
important archaeological sites and historic treasures”); DEP’T OF DEF., FINAL REPORT TO
CONGRESS: CONDUCT OF THE PERSIAN GULF WAR 82 (1992) [hereinafter GULF WAR FINAL
REPORT], available at http://www.ndu.edu/library/epubs/cpgw.pdf (describing the way in
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practice of using hospitals and mosques for military purposes during Operation
Iraqi Freedom, as one example. Emphasizing that such use was illegal under
LOAC, Human Rights Watch’s report Off Target explains that the “protection
ceases [when] medical establishments are used to commit ‘acts harmful to the
enemy.’ By using hospitals as military headquarters, Iraqi forces turned them into
military objectives.” 55 During recent armed strife in Thailand, both sides regularly
used schools as headquarters or barracks for soldiers or militants and also located
military objectives in schools. 56
All of these examples highlight the need for a thorough and nuanced
understanding of the definition of military objective, the obligations LOAC places
on parties to identify military objectives before launching attacks, and how these
definitions and obligations play out in conflicts with non-state actors. Before
addressing the particular questions and issues that arise with regard to the
identification of military objectives in non-international armed conflict, the
following section sets forth the definition of military objective and the key issues
inherent in the application of the definition during military operations.
II. DEFINITION OF MILITARY OBJECTIVE
The principle of distinction obligates parties to a conflict not only to
differentiate between civilians and combatants, but also between civilian objects
and military objects as well. 57 Separating civilian and military objects forms a
critical component of the protection of the civilian population during armed
conflict. The earliest mention of the term “military objective” appears in the 1923
Hague Rules of Air Warfare, a set of rules drafted by a Commission of Jurists
established by the Washington Conference of 1922 on the Limitation of
Armaments. Article 24(1) of the 1923 Hague Rules states, “Aerial bombardment is
legitimate only when directed at a military objective, that is to say, an object of
which the destruction or injury would constitute a distinct military advantage to the

which the Iraqis dispersed aircraft into civilian areas to prevent the destruction of the Iraqi
air force); Dexter Filkins, In Taking Falluja Mosque, Victory by the Inch, N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
27, 2004, at A1; Carlotta Gall, Americans Face Rising Threat from Taliban, INT’L HERALD
TRIB. (N.Y.C.), July 15, 2008, at 4; Jeremy Rabkin, The Fantasy World of International
Law: The Criticism of Israel Has Been Disproportionate, WKLY. STANDARD, Aug. 21,
2006, at 27.
55
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, OFF TARGET: THE CONDUCT OF THE WAR AND CIVILIAN
CASUALTIES IN IRAQ 72–73 (2003) (quoting Geneva Convention IV, supra note 12, art. 18)
(criticizing the use of hospitals as headquarters by the Iraqi military).
56
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, SCHOOLS AND ARMED CONFLICT 5 (2011), available at
http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/crd0711webwcover.pdf. One mother in
Thailand explained, for example, after removing her children from a school occupied by
paramilitary forces for two years, “when they moved into the school, I feared there would
be an attack on the school, so that is the reason I withdrew my children. . . . [I]f there was
an attack on the grounds, the children would be hit as well.” Id.
57
Additional Protocol I, supra note 12, art. 52(1).
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belligerent.” 58 The second paragraph of that article offers examples of military
objectives: “military forces; military works; military establishments or depots;
manufacturing plants constituting important and well-known centres for the
production of arms, ammunition, or characterized military supplies; lines of
communication or of transport which are used for military purposes.” 59 Although
the 1923 Hague Rules were never adopted as a binding legal instrument, they
remain important “as an authoritative attempt to clarify and formulate rules of law
governing the use of aircraft in war.” 60
Other early categorizations of military objectives included steel works, motor
and engineering works, docks and dockside warehouses, waterworks, gasworks,
refining and oil storage depots, and oil wells, for example. 61 Finally, one
comprehensive survey looking back at the understanding of the notion of military
objective at the end of World War II presents the following list of items considered
to be military targets:
military equipment, units, and bases; economic targets; power sources
(coal, oil, electric, hydroelectric); industry (war supporting
manufacturing, export and/or import); transportation (equipment, lines of
communication, and petroleum, oil, and other lubricants necessary for
transportation); command and control; geographic; personnel; military;
and civilians taking part in the hostilities, including civilians working in
industries directly related to the war effort. 62
Although the 1949 Geneva Conventions reference the term “military objective,”
the drafters of the conventions did not include any definition in the treaties.
At the time of the drafting of the Additional Protocols in 1977, the drafters
recognized the need for a comprehensive definition “if the essential distinction
between combatants and civilians and between civilian objects and military
objectives was to be maintained.” 63 Article 52 of Additional Protocol I thus
contains the definition of military objective, which is considered to be customary
international law. 64 First, Article 52(1) declares that “[c]ivilian objects shall not be
the object of attack or of reprisals” and defines civilian objects as “all objects

58

Rules Concerning the Control of Wireless Telegraphy in Time of War and Air
Warfare art. 24(1), drafted Dec. 1922–Feb. 1923, reprinted in THE LAWS OF ARMED
CONFLICTS, supra note 48, at 315.
59
Id. art. 24(2).
60
2 L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW: A TREATISE 519 (H. Lauterpacht ed., 7th
ed. 1948), quoted in THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICTS, supra note 48, at 315.
61
A.P.V. ROGERS, LAW ON THE BATTLEFIELD 30 (1996) (citing J. STONE, LEGAL
CONTROLS OF INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT 624 (1954)).
62
W. Hays Parks, Air War and the Law of War, 32 A.F. L. REV. 1, 55 (1990).
63
CLAUDE PILLOUD ET AL., supra note 10, at 631.
64
THEODOR MERON, HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMANITARIAN NORMS AS CUSTOMARY
LAW 64–65 (1989).
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which are not military objectives.” 65 Like the definition of civilian in Article 50 of
Additional Protocol I, 66 the definition of civilian object is a negative one,
dependent on the definition of military objective, which appears in Article 52(2):
In so far as objects are concerned, military objectives are limited to those
objects which by their nature, location, purpose or use make an effective
contribution to military action and whose total or partial destruction,
capture or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a
definite military advantage. 67
The definition includes four criteria for determining whether a particular object
qualifies as a military objective by making an effective contribution to military
action—nature, location, use, or purpose.
Nature refers to “all objects directly used by the armed forces: weapons,
equipment, transports, fortifications, depots, buildings occupied by armed forces,
staff headquarters, communications centres, etc.” 68 Thus, military bases, units,
equipment and forces, for example, can be attacked at any time. These are objects
that are inherently military, that is, they have “intrinsic military significance” 69 and
by their nature make an effective contribution to military action. Targeting such
objects fits directly within the concept of military necessity as understood in the
Lieber Code and subsequent LOAC treaties and commentary—the authority to
take all measures not forbidden by the law that are indispensable for securing the
complete submission of the enemy 70—because they enable the opposing forces to
wage war. Two extensive lists of objects that are inherently military by nature offer
useful guidance for understanding the concept of “nature” in the definition of
military objective. The first, drawn up by the International Committee of the Red
Cross (ICRC) in 1956 as an annex to the Draft Rules for the Limitation of Dangers
incurred by the Civilian Population in Time of War, includes:
(2) Positions, installations or constructions occupied by the [armed]
forces . . . as well as combat objectives (that is to say, those objectives
which are directly contested in battle between land or sea forces
including airborne forces).
(3) Installations, constructions and other works of a military nature, such
as barracks, fortifications, War Ministries (e.g. Ministries of Army,
Navy, Air Force, National Defence, Supply) and other organs for the
direction and administration of military operations.
65

Additional Protocol I, supra note 12, art. 52(1).
Id. art. 50(1) (“A civilian is any person who does not belong to one of the
categories of persons referred to in Article 4 A (1), (2), (3) and (6) of the Third Convention
and in Article 43 of this Protocol.”).
67
Additional Protocol I, supra note 12, art. 52(2).
68
PILLOUD ET AL., supra note 10, at 636.
69
Schmitt, supra note 37, at 280.
70
THE LIEBER CODE, supra note 48, art. 14.
66
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(4) Stores of arms or military sup[p]lies, such as munition dumps, stores
of equipment or fuel, vehicles parks.
(5) Airfields, rocket launching ramps and naval base installations.
(6) Those of the lines and means of communications (railway lines,
roads, bridges, tunnels and canals) which are of fundamental military
importance.
(7) The installations of broadcasting and television stations; telephone
and telegraph exchanges of fundamental military importance.
(8) Industries of fundamental importance for the conduct of the war:
(a) industries for the manufacture of armaments such as
weapons, munitions, rockets, armoured vehicles, military
aircraft, fighting ships, including the manufacture of
accessories and all other war material;
(b) industries for the manufacture of supplies and material of a
military character, such as transport and communications
material, equipment of the armed forces;
(c) factories or plant[s] constituting other production and
manufacturing centres of fundamental importance for the
conduct of war, such as the metallurgical, engineering and
chemical industries, whose nature or purpose is essentially
military;
(d) storage and transport installations whose basic function it is
to serve the industries referred to in (a)–(c);
(e) installations providing energy mainly for national defence,
e.g. coal, other fuels, or atomic energy, and plants producing
gas or electricity mainly for military consumption.
(9) Installations constituting experimental, research centres for
experiments on and the development of weapons and war material.71
The second commonly relied-upon list is the following one drawn up by Major
General A.P.V. Rogers, a former Director of British Army Legal Services, using
the Additional Protocol I definition and his own review of state practice:
military personnel and persons who take part in the fighting without
being members of the armed forces; military facilities, military
equipment, including military vehicles, weapons, munitions and stores of
fuel, military works, including defensive works and fortifications,
military depots and establishments, including War and Supply
Ministries; works producing or developing military supplies and other
supplies of military value, including metallurgical, engineering and
chemical industries supporting the war effort; areas of land of military
significance such as hills, defiles and bridgeheads; railways, ports,
airfields, bridges, main roads as well as tunnels and canals; oil and other
71

PILLOUD ET AL., supra note 10, at 632–33 n.3.
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power installations; communications installations, including broadcasting
and television stations and telephone and telegraph stations used for
military communications.72
The lists excerpted above include a fairly comprehensive collection of objects
that fall within the category of “nature”—that is, they have an intrinsically military
character. For most of these objects, their use at a given moment is not necessarily
relevant—barring use for a distinct civilian purpose, such as using empty military
barracks to house civilian refugees—because they automatically contribute to the
enemy’s ability to wage war and therefore their destruction, neutralization, or
capture offers a definite military advantage.
Location is an important factor because certain objects, such as bridges, make
a direct contribution to military action regardless of whether they have a military
function. Another example could be a particular site that is critical for military
operations because it must be seized, or because it is important to prevent the
enemy from seizing it, or to force the enemy to retreat from it. It is generally
accepted that a certain area of land can be a military objective by virtue of its
location, although in most cases, “there must be a distinctive feature turning a
piece of land into a military objective (e.g., an important mountain pass; a trail in
the jungle or in a swamp area; a bridgehead; or a spit of land controlling the
entrance of a harbour).” 73
The categories of “use” and “purpose” refer respectively to an object’s present
or intended function and will often involve objects that do not appear to be military
upon first impression, thus requiring further examination in given situations. An
example of use that would cause an object to be classified as a military objective
would be school buses, or private taxis, 74 used to transport troops to the front
during conflict. Purpose, in contrast, depends on the enemy’s intended future use
of an object and must inherently be based on intelligence gathering and analysis
regarding the enemy’s intentions. Thus, “[w]hen reliable intelligence or other
information indicates that the enemy intends to use an object militarily in the
future, the object qualifies as a military objective through ‘purpose.’” 75 The
Eritrea-Ethiopia Claims Commission relied on this criterion for the definition of
military objective in holding that the Hirgigo Power Station in Eritrea was a lawful
military objective, liable to attack by Ethiopian forces. The power station was
under construction and, once completed, would have provided power to the nearby
72

ROGERS, supra note 61, at 37. Another useful list appears in DINSTEIN, supra note
37, at 88.
73
DINSTEIN, supra note 37, at 92.
74
During World War I, the “Taxis of the Marne” were commandeered to bring French
reserve units to the front line; once they were used in that manner, they became legitimate
military objectives even though when they served their normal purpose—private taxis—
they were civilian objects. See id. at 90 (citing GEORG SCHWARZENBERGER, 2
INTERNATIONAL LAW AS APPLIED BY INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS: THE LAW
OF ARMED CONFLICT 112 (1968)).
75
Schmitt, supra note 37, at 280.
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port and naval base. As the Commission explained, “a State at war should not be
obligated to wait until an object is, in fact, put into use when the purpose of that
object is such that it will make an effective contribution to military action once it
has been tested, commissioned and put to use.” 76
These four criteria are used to determine whether the object in question makes
an effective contribution to military action—by its nature, location, use, or
purpose. The definition of military objective contains a second requirement as
well, that the destruction, capture or neutralization of the object offers a definite
military advantage. Here, the benefit from the attack—the military advantage—
cannot be simply hypothetical or speculative. As the Commentary to Additional
Protocol I explains, “[I]t is not legitimate to launch an attack which only offers
potential or indeterminate advantages.” 77 The concept of definite military
advantage can thus often be hard to quantify: at one level, the destruction or
neutralization of any object that makes an effective contribution to military action
would seem to offer a definite military advantage. Indeed, as some commentators
have explained,
In practice, . . . one cannot imagine that the destruction, capture, or
neutralization of an object contributing to the military action of one side
would not be militarily advantageous for the enemy; it is just as difficult
to imagine how the destruction, capture, or neutralization of an object
could be a military advantage for one side if that same object did not
somehow contribute to the military action of the enemy. 78
However, any assessment of military advantage must be made in light of the
circumstances prevailing at the time, such that a civilian object would not offer a
definite military advantage at one moment but then could indeed qualify as such if
being used as a command post, to store weapons or to launch attacks.
Military advantage also is not limited solely to the tactical gains from the
particular attack or parts of an attack, but extends to the attack as a whole and to
the security of the attacking force. 79 As an example, the attacking party may see a
definite military advantage in an attack that causes the defending party to focus its
strategic and tactical energies on one sector, leaving another sector unprotected.
Alternatively, a “classic example involves an attack constituting a ruse intended to
cause the enemy to believe an operation is to take place at other than its intended
76

Western Front, Aerial Bombardment and Related Claims (Eri. v. Eth.), 26 R.I.A.A.
291, 334–35 (Eri.-Eth. Claims Comm’n 2005).
77
See PILLOUD ET AL., supra note 10, at 636.
78
1 MARCO SASSÒLI ET AL., HOW DOES LAW PROTECT IN WAR? 252 n.196 (3d ed.,
2011).
79
See, e.g., U.K. MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, JSP 383: THE JOINT SERVICE MANUAL OF
THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT 5.4.4(j) (2004) (“The military advantage anticipated from
an attack refers to the advantage anticipated from the attack considered as a whole and not
only from isolated or particular parts of the attack. The advantage need not be
immediate.”).
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location.” 80 The immediate military advantage of destroying the physical target of
the attack may be small, but the actual military advantage—to the extent the enemy
is fooled regarding the actual location of the operation—“can prove significant.” 81
The Allied bombing of bridges and railroad tracks in the Pas de Calais region of
France before the invasion at Normandy offered just such an advantage: “[t]he
Germans were convinced that the invasion would occur in the Pas de Calais,
thereby diverting the Germans from Normandy.” 82
Although Additional Protocol I applies, as a matter of treaty law, only to
international armed conflicts, these rules for determining when objects constitute
military objectives apply in both international and non-international armed conflict
as a matter of customary law as well. 83 Furthermore, several treaties applicable in
non-international armed conflict incorporate this definition of military objective,
including Amended Protocol II to the Convention on Certain Conventional
Weapons 84 and the Second Protocol to the Hague Convention for the Protection of
Cultural Property. 85 As the following section discusses, the nature of noninternational armed conflicts, and of the non-state entities that fight in such
conflicts, raises a range of interesting and challenging questions about how the
definition of military objective applies, and should apply, in such situations.
III. IDENTIFYING MILITARY OBJECTIVES IN CONFLICTS WITH NON-STATE
ACTORS: THE CHALLENGES OF POSITIVE IDENTIFICATION
Several components of the definition of military objective and aspects of the
identification of objects in accordance with that definition play out differently in
conflicts with non-state actors than in the classic international armed conflict. Noninternational armed conflicts can take a variety of forms, some of which present
80

Michael N. Schmitt, Targeting in Operational Law, in THE HANDBOOK OF THE
INTERNATIONAL LAW OF MILITARY OPERATIONS 245, 254 (Terry D. Gill & Dieter Fleck
eds., 2010).
81
Id.
82
Jeanne M. Meyer, Tearing Down the Facade: A Critical Look at the Current Law
on Targeting the Will of The Enemy and Air Force Doctrine, 51 A.F. L. REV. 143, 173
(2001).
83
1 HENCKAERTS & DOSWALD-BECK, supra note 9, at 29.
84
Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and
Other Devices as Amended on 3 May 1996 (Protocol II as amended on 3 May 1996)
annexed to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain
Conventional Weapons which may be deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to have
Indiscriminate Effects art. 2, para. 6, May 3, 1996, 2048 U.N.T.S. 93.
85
Second Protocol to the Hague Convention of 1954 for the Protection of Cultural
Property in the Event of Armed Conflict art. 1(f), opened for signature May 17, 1999, 2253
U.N.T.S. 172. Protocol III to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, made
applicable in non-international armed conflicts pursuant to an amendment of Article 1 of
the Convention adopted by consensus in 2001, also includes this definition of military
objective. See Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Incendiary Weapons
(Protocol III) art. 1, para. 3, opened for signature Apr. 10, 1981, 1342 U.N.T.S. 171.
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additional complications for either the determination of military objectives or the
operational decision-making process regarding the lawfulness of attacking such
objectives. It is important to note, at the outset, that some of these challenges arise
directly within LOAC and relate to how the definition of military objectives is or
should be applied; others stem from jus ad bellum or other legal paradigms
relevant to the use of force against a non-state actor, or lie within the operational
realm.
To that end, consider the different forms a conflict with a non-state actor can
take: a purely internal conflict between a government and an organized armed
group; a conflict between two or more organized armed groups within a single
State; a conflict between the government and an organized armed group that spills
over into one or more neighboring States; a cross-border conflict in which
government forces combat an organized armed group operating from the territory
of a neighboring State; a conflict in which multi-national forces fight alongside, or
in support of, the host government in its conflict with one or more organized armed
groups; 86 or a conflict between government forces and an organized armed group
operating transnationally with hostilities occurring in and across the territory
of several States. 87 Debates surrounding the characterization of conflict with
transnational terrorist groups as armed conflicts triggering LOAC are outside the
scope of this Article; for the purposes of the instant analysis, it is simply important
to note that non-international armed conflicts include a variety of conflict scenarios
not limited to fighting within the confines of a single State. 88 The difference
86

See Int’l Comm. of the Red Cross [ICRC], International Humanitarian Law and
the Challenges of Contemporary Armed Conflict, at 9–11, ICRC Doc. 31IC/11/5.1.2, (Oct.
2011).
87
See, e.g., Geoffrey S. Corn, Hamdan, Lebanon, and the Regulation of Hostilities:
The Need to Recognize a Hybrid Category of Armed Conflict, 40 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L.
295, 299–300 (2007) (calling for the recognition of a hybrid category of “transnational
armed conflict” triggering the application of the foundational principles of laws of war);
Geoffrey Corn & Eric Talbot Jensen, Transnational Armed Conflict: A “Principled”
Approach to the Regulation of Counter-Terror Combat Operations, 42 ISR. L. REV. 46, 78–
79 (2009) (arguing that counter-terror military operations should be regulated by
fundamental principles of the LOAC).
88
Although debate continues regarding the characterization of the United States’
struggle with al-Qaeda and other terrorist groups as an armed conflict, there is a general
consensus that the United States is engaged in a non-international armed conflict with alQaeda. Much of the debate surrounds the parameters of that conflict—whether it includes
all instances in which U.S. forces engage with al-Qaeda and associated forces wherever
that occurs, or whether the existence of an armed conflict between the two parties must be
determined on an individual basis in each geographical location affected. All three
branches of the U.S. government have demonstrated that they view the situation as an
armed conflict. See Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, § 2(a),
115 Stat. 224 (2001) (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1541 note); Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S.
557, 628 (2006); Military Order of November 13, 2001, § 1(a), 3 C.F.R. 918 (2002)
(stating that the September 11th attacks “created a state of armed conflict that requires the
use of the United States Armed Forces”); Procedures for Trials by Military Commissions
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between a conflict occurring solely within the territory of the State fighting against
the organized armed group and a conflict in which a State is fighting an organized
armed group in the neighboring State, or perhaps operating in a number of
locations around the world, can present significant interpretive and operational
differences in the application and implementation of the definition of military
objectives and the obligations of distinction the definition mandates.
A. “Nature”
As the Commentary explains, “nature” refers to all objects directly used by
the armed forces. A look at the lists proffered—some of which are reproduced or
excerpted above—as examples of objects that are military by nature evinces a
broad understanding of what it means to be military by nature. Not only are
military depots, tanks, aircraft and other military equipment included in this
category, but also roadways, industries producing components of war materiel, and
communications networks, for example. In an international armed conflict, this
broad conception of “nature” flows naturally from the principle of military
necessity and is based on the State’s control over these networks, resources and
industries. Non-international armed conflict—in particular the identification of
targets on the non-state actor side of the equation—introduce additional
considerations, however. When there is no state actor, does the notion of “nature”
change? And, if so, in what ways does it change?
1. The Nature of the Non-State Actor
The type of non-international armed conflict and the role of the non-state
actor can have a significant impact on how “nature” should be interpreted. At one
extreme, many non-state armed groups do not control any significant territory or
any infrastructure. In such situations, it is reasonable to conclude that only the
group’s military equipment and installations, to the extent they have bases or other
of Certain Non-United States Citizens in the War Against Terrorism, 32 C.F.R. §§ 9.1, 9.3
(2012); see also U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, REPLY OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES
OF AMERICA TO THE REPORT OF THE FIVE UNHCR SPECIAL RAPPORTEURS ON DETAINEES
IN GUANTANAMO BAY, CUBA 4 (Mar. 10, 2006), available at http://www.asil.org/pdfs/
ilib0603212.pdf (“[T]he United States is engaged in a continuing armed conflict against Al
Qaida, the Taliban and other terrorist organizations supporting them, with troops on the
ground in several places engaged in combat operations.”); Harold Hongju Koh, Legal
Adviser, U.S. Dep’t of State, Speech at the Annual Meeting of the American Society of
International Law: The Obama Administration and International Law (Mar. 25, 2010),
available at http://www.state.gov/s/l/releases/remarks/139119.htm (“[T]he United States is
in an armed conflict with al-Qaeda, as well as the Taliban and associated forces . . . .”). The
U.S. characterization of the conflict does not depend on geographical or territorial lines. In
contrast, for example, “the ICRC does not share the view that a conflict of global
dimensions is or has been taking place,” and instead favors a case-by-case analysis of the
various situations in question. See ICRC, supra note 86, at 10–11.
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headquarters, could fit within the category of “nature” in defining objects as
military objectives. For example, during the conflict in the Philippines between the
government and multiple insurgent groups, the government forces attacked the
“Bangsamoro Islamic Armed Forces (BIAF)’s 113th Base Command.” 89 Similarly,
Turkish warplanes have attacked PKK ammunition depots in Iraqi Kurdistan. 90
However, other objects listed in the 1956 ICRC list or other compilations of
objects of a military “nature” no longer seem to fit in that category—industries,
roadways, communications networks, war ministries, and the like—because they
are not within the non-state actor’s authority in any way. For example, television
and broadcast stations, which appear on both the ICRC list and the list drawn up
by Major General Rogers, are often identified as legitimate military objectives in
conflicts between States. 91 Thus, when NATO bombed the Serbian Radio and TV
Station (RTS) during Operation Allied Force in 1999, the broadcasting station was
a lawful military objective as “part of a more general attack aimed at disrupting the
FRY Command, Control and Communications network, the nerve centre and
apparatus that keeps Milosević in power.” 92 Similarly, in July 2011, NATO forces
implementing the U.N. Security Council Resolution authorizing the use of force to
protect civilians in Libya bombed the state television satellite transmitters in
Tripoli because it was “an integral component of the regime apparatus designed to
systematically oppress and threaten civilians.” 93 These broadcast stations were
89

MILF Claims AFP Attacked Its Forces in Zambo Sibugay, GMA NEWS ONLINE
(Oct. 22, 2011, 2:14 PM), http://www.gmanetwork.com/news/story/236222/news/nation/
milf-claims-afp-attacked-its-forces-in-zambo-sibugay.
90
Turkish Military Jets Strike Kurdish PKK Targets in Iraqi Kurdistan, KURD NET
(Dec. 27, 2012), http://www.ekurd.net/mismas/articles/misc2012/12/turkey4379.htm.
91
See DINSTEIN, supra note 37, at 98 (“[I]t is noteworthy that the Hague Cultural
Property Convention of 1954 refers to any ‘broadcasting station’ as a military objective (in
the same breath as an aerodrome and a port).”) (quoting Convention for the Protection of
Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict, art. 8(1)(a), opened for signature May
14, 1954, S. EXEC. REP. 110-26, 249 U.N.T.S. 240).
92
INT’L CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGO., FINAL REPORT TO THE
PROSECUTOR BY THE COMMITTEE ESTABLISHED TO REVIEW THE NATO BOMBING
CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA para. 75 (2000) [hereinafter
NATO BOMBING REPORT], reprinted in 39 I.L.M. 1257 (2000); see also W.J. Fenrick,
Targeting and Proportionality During the NATO Bombing Campaign Against Yugoslavia,
12 EUR. J. INT’L L. 489, 496 (2001) (“RTS would be a military objective if it was integrated
into the military command, control or communications system.”). There was extensive
criticism of the decision to target the RTS broadcast station, from both human rights
organizations and from other States, including coalition partners within NATO. See
Amnesty Int’l, NATO/Federal Republic of Yugoslavia: “Collateral Damage” or Unlawful
Killings?: Violations of the Laws of War by NATO During Operation Allied Force, AI
Index EUR 70/18/2000 (June 5, 2000); HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, CIVILIAN DEATHS IN THE
NATO AIR CAMPAIGN 30 (2000).
93
Press Release, N. Atl. Treaty Org., NATO Strikes Libyan State TV Satellite
Facility (July 30, 2011) [hereinafter NATO Press Release], available at http://www.nato.int
/cps/en/SID-82983FF0-6E3BF21C/natolive/ news_76776.htm.

2013]

EXTENDING POSITIVE IDENTIFICATION FROM PERSONS TO PLACES

1249

military objectives regardless of whether the State was actually using them as
communications networks at the time of the attack because they were part of the
communications network the State used in advance of its military effort (although
in both cases, the State was using them directly in furtherance of its own
objectives). In contrast, in the case of the non-state armed group, a broadcast
station could certainly be a lawful military objective, but would likely only meet
that definition as a result of the group’s use of the station.
Where a non-state armed group controls or administers territory, this
conclusion regarding where a broadcast station—or other communications network
equipment—fits in the definition of military objective might be entirely different.
Imagine that the rebel forces in Libya set up their own broadcast network for a
variety of purposes. At that point, the analysis would likely be the same as that for
the State as in the examples from Libya and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
above. In the context of a conflict between a State and a non-state actor operating
in the territory of the neighboring State, however, the notion of “nature” would be
similarly more limited in most situations. Lebanese television stations, for
example, would not be military by nature in a conflict between Israel and
Hezbollah in southern Lebanon. Such stations could well constitute military
objectives nonetheless if Hezbollah were using them as part of a communications
or command and control network, but under the criterion of “use,” not “nature.” In
contrast, Hezbollah’s own television station was a target of Israeli attack during the
2006 Israel-Hezbollah conflict because, according to Israeli analysis, Hezbollah’s
al-Manar broadcast station served as a central communications and recruitment
tool for Hezbollah. 94 The distinctions between these various classifications of the
same type of object highlight how the various components of the definition of
military objectives can differ in conflicts with non-state actors.
As a result, the concept of “nature” as a definitional component of military
objective must be understood differently in conflicts with non-state actors. It will
also vary across the different types of conflicts with non-state actors. It is
important to emphasize, however, that this varying conception of “nature” does not
necessarily mean that fewer objects will constitute lawful military objectives in
such conflicts. Rather, the operational consequences will be insignificant in most
cases because most of these “nature” objects will also fall within the “use” or
“purpose” categories; the difference lies in the legal analysis of determining why
objects satisfy the definition of military objective.

94

See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, WHY THEY DIED: CIVILIAN CASUALTIES IN LEBANON
DURING THE 2006 WAR 75 (2007), available at http://www.hrw.org/sites/defaultz/files/
reports/lebanon0907.pdf; Summary of IDF Operations Against Hizbullah in Lebanon, ISR.
MINISTRY FOREIGN AFF. (July 13, 2006), http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Terrorism+Obstacle
+to+Peace/Terrorism+from+Lebanon-+Hizbullah/IDF+operations+against+Hizbullah+in+
Lebanon+13-Jul-2006.htm; Hezbollah’s Al-Manar Television Station Legitimate Target of
Israeli Response, FOUND. FOR DEF. DEMOCRACIES (July 13, 2006), http://www.defenddemo
cracy.org/media-hit/hezbollahs-al-manar-television-station-legitimate-target-of-israeli-respons.
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2. The Special Case of Terrorist Groups Governing Territory
The type of non-state armed group—domestic rebel group, transnational
terrorist organization, cross-border insurgency—involved in the conflict does not
necessarily impact the military objective analysis. However, in cases of terrorist
entities, the different perceptions of the group’s purposes and activities can be an
important factor. For example, the nature of Hamas as a terrorist organization
governing a non-state entity and engaging in terrorism and insurgent warfare
introduces challenging questions with regard to the specifics of the definition of
military objectives. The perception of how and if such organizations have nonmilitary or non-terrorist activities and infrastructure bears directly on the analysis
of which objects constitute military objectives in the case of armed conflict.
During Operation Cast Lead, the conflict between Israel and Hamas and other
Palestinian groups from December 2008 to January 2009, for example, this issue
proved consequential in the legal analysis of Israeli targeting decisions. 95 The
Israel Defense Forces targeted a broad swath of government buildings and civilian
political infrastructure in Gaza, including civilian ministries, the al-Saraya prison
and the Palestinian Legislative Council building. 96 In response to criticism of these
strikes, the Israel Defense Forces explained,
While Hamas operates ministries and is in charge of a variety of
administrative and traditionally governmental functions in the Gaza
Strip, it still remains a terrorist organisation. Many of the ostensibly
civilian elements of its regime are in reality active components of its
terrorist and military efforts. Indeed, Hamas does not separate its civilian
and military activities in the manner in which a legitimate government
might. Instead, Hamas uses apparatuses under its control, including
quasi-governmental institutions, to promote its terrorist activity. 97
In essence, therefore, Hamas’s terrorist activities turned all Hamas infrastructure
into terrorist—or enemy military—infrastructure. The Goldstone Report, in
contrast, found that such buildings could not be military objectives because they
were not “war ministries,” the only types of ministries on the two lists of military
objectives referenced above. 98
Although the Israeli position that all Hamas buildings were part of the
terrorist infrastructure and therefore legitimate targets is a clear broadening of the
95

STATE OF ISR., THE OPERATION IN GAZA 27 DECEMBER 2008–18 JANUARY 2009:
FACTUAL AND LEGAL ASPECTS 86–89 (2009).
96
See U.N. Human Rights Council, Human Rights In Palestine and Other Occupied
Arab Territories, Rep. of the U.N. Fact-Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict, 12th Sess.,
paras. 32, 364–77, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/12/48 (2009) [hereinafter Goldstone Report]
(describing attacks on Palestinian Legislative Council building and Gaza al-Sarayah
prison); STATE OF ISR., supra note 95, at 89 (discussing attacks on “civilian ministries”).
97
STATE OF ISR., supra note 95, at 89.
98
Goldstone Report, supra note 96, paras. 385–87.
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category of military objectives and legitimate targets, the opposing viewpoint is
equally notable in its narrow interpretation of the definition of military objectives.
Hamas has no “war ministry,” but rather multiple armed entities engaged in
operations against Israel, making this distinction too elementary. The Interior
Ministry, for example, oversees “Hamas-controlled government forces in Gaza.” 99
According to Article 52(2) and the ICRC’s list of military objectives, it meets the
standard of a military objective because it makes an effective contribution to
military action and its neutralization or destruction would offer a direct military
advantage for Israel by eliminating or curtailing the ability of those forces to
engage in combat. Moreover, the ICRC list specifically mentions “other organs for
the direction and administration of military objectives” as legitimate military
objectives. 100 Given the nature of Hamas’s infrastructure, a number of its buildings
would so qualify. 101
These examples from Operation Cast Lead demonstrate the challenges in
assessing the relationship between a so-called political wing and military wing of a
terrorist organization and the impact of that relationship on the definition of
military objectives as applied to components of the organization’s infrastructure.
Neither the broad approach nor the narrow interpretation is satisfying in light of
the factual realities; such approaches seem too simplistic for the complexities of
the situation. At a minimum, however, unease with the all-or-nothing dichotomy
presented in the legal analyses of targeting in Operation Cast Lead highlights the
need for a more nuanced understanding of the criterion of “nature” in the definition
of military objectives and its interpretation in different types of conflicts with nonstate actors. Beyond that, the concept of “nature” begins to give way to the
concepts of “use” or “purpose” in these situations: because defining the parameters
of “nature” becomes difficult due to the qualities and characteristics of the nonstate actor and its overall role and activities, “nature” becomes a narrower category
and less prominent in the military objective analysis.
B. Use . . . or Dual Use?
In all conflicts, the line between military and civilian objects can be hard to
draw and is often blurry at best. Many buildings—schools, residential buildings,
post offices, hotels, and the like—are civilian in nature but might be used
extensively for military purposes. As the Commentary to the Additional Protocols
explains, “a school or a hotel is a civilian object, but if . . . used to accommodate
99

Nidal al-Mughrabi, Israel Flattens Hamas Ministry in Gaza Strip, REUTERS (Jan.
18, 2008, 8:40 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2008/01/19/us-palestinians-israel-idUS
L1730626720080119; see also DINSTEIN, supra note 37, at 98 (noting that while a
“sweeping allusion” to all government buildings as legitimate targets “is wrong,”
nonetheless “[g]overnment offices can be considered legitimate targets for attack only
when used in pursuance or support of military functions”).
100
NATO BOMBING REPORT, supra note 92, para. 39.
101
See MATTHEW LEVITT, HAMAS: POLITICS, CHARITY, AND TERRORISM IN THE
SERVICE OF JIHAD 97 (2006).
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troops or headquarters staff, [it will] become [a] military objective[].” 102 Examples
of civilian objects that make an effective contribution to military action could
include “civilian buses or trucks which are being transported to the front to move
soldiers from point A to point B, [or] a factory which is producing ball bearings for
the military.” 103 In such situations, the analysis under Article 52(2) of Additional
Protocol I centers on whether the use of the object in question makes an effective
contribution to military action—the first part of the definition of military
objective—and whether its destruction, capture, or neutralization offers a definite
military advantage. During the Croatian operation to retake the Krajina region in
the summer of 1995, the ICTY thus found that the post office in Knin (the capital
of the self-proclaimed Republic of Serbian Krajina) and a screws and bolts factory
believed to be a logistics supply facility and ammunition components factory were
lawful military objectives. First, the post office was thought to be used as a
communications center for the Serb forces in the Krajina (SVK) and the
government of the Republic of Serbian Krajina—fulfilling the “use” criterion of
the definition of military objective. 104 Second, because there was “evidence
[indicating] that the SVK planned to produce weapons-related products at the . . .
factory,” the factory was a lawful military objective within the “purpose” criterion
of Article 52(2). 105
The term “dual-use” takes the blurring of civilian and military objects yet
another step and refers to objects that simultaneously have a civilian and military
use. In nearly all conflicts, “the military uses civilian infrastructure,
telecommunications and logistics also for military purposes. In industrialized
countries power-generating stations are crucial for civilian access to clean water,
but they also provide power to war industries—and in an integrated power grid all
stations provide power to both.” 106 The term is thus most often applied to
infrastructure, such as electricity-generating plants or oil refineries, that serves
both functions at the same time. In other words, the dual-use description is
applicable “not when a facility sometimes serves civilian purposes and sometimes
serves military purposes, [as in the examples above,] but rather when it

102

PILLOUD ET AL., supra note 10, at 636; see, e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra
note 56, at 5 (describing how paramilitary forces in Thailand occupied schools for two
years during the conflict there).
103
INT’L & OPERATIONAL LAW DEP’T, THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GEN.’S LEGAL CTR. &
SCH., OPERATIONAL LAW HANDBOOK 20 (Brian Bill & Jeremy Marsh eds., 2010).
104
Prosecutor v. Ante Gotovina, Case No. IT-06-90-T, Judgement, ¶ 1899 (Int’l Crim.
Trib. For the Former Yugoslavia Apr. 15, 2011), available at http://www.icty.org/x/cases/g
otovina/tjug/en/110415_judgement_vol2.pdf
105
Id. ¶ 1902.
106
MARCO SASSÒLI, LEGITIMATE TARGETS OF ATTACKS UNDER INTERNATIONAL
HUMANITARIAN LAW 7 (2003), available at http://www.hpcrresearch.org/sites/default/files/
publications/Session1.pdf.
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continuously serves both civilian purposes and military purposes.” 107 As one of the
authoritative commentaries on Additional Protocol I explains, civilian
transportation hubs and other civilian objects contributing to military operations
can constitute military objectives:
The objects classified as military objectives under this definition include
much more than strictly military objects such as military vehicles,
weapons, munitions, stores of fuel and fortifications. Provided the
objects meet the two-pronged test, under the circumstances ruling at the
time (not at some hypothetical future time), military objectives include
activities providing administrative and logistical support to military
operations such as transportation and communications systems, railroads,
airfields and port facilities and industries of fundamental importance for
the conduct of the armed conflict. 108
A first question in conflicts with non-state actors is whether nearly everything
is essentially dual-use, because of the intermingling of the non-state group with the
civilian population and—in many cases—its lack of territorial control or governing
authority. As noted in Part II.A above, the concept of “nature” narrows
considerably when analyzing the types of military objectives in such conflicts
because, in many cases, non-state armed groups have very little in the way of
buildings, property, or other objects that are inherently military in nature as
described in the 1956 ICRC list or other lists of military objectives.109 In addition,
because most non-state armed groups operate in and among the civilian population,
few objects that qualify as military objectives due to “use” or “purpose” will be
solely military in that use or purpose—whether “rocket villages” in southern
Lebanon that are also home to hundreds of civilians, or schools used by
paramilitaries in Thailand while classes are still ongoing, or hospitals storing
rockets in Gaza while patients are being treated on floors just above. When every
target becomes a dual-use target, the targeting process becomes more complex,

107

Henry Shue & David Wippman, Limiting Attacks on Dual-Use Facilities
Performing Indispensable Civilian Functions, 35 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 559, 562 (2002); see
also SASSÒLI, supra note 106, at 7; Meyer, supra note 82, at 178.
108
MICHAEL BOTHE ET AL., NEW RULES FOR VICTIMS OF ARMED CONFLICTS:
COMMENTARY ON THE TWO 1977 PROTOCOLS ADDITIONAL TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS
OF 1949, at 323–24 (1982); see also Carolin Wuerzner, Mission Impossible? Bringing
Charges for the Crime of Attacking Civilians or Civilian Objects Before International
Criminal Tribunals, 90 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 907, 918–19 (2008) (“With many objects,
including communications systems, transport systems, manufacturing plants and so on, the
question of how to classify them is of great importance . . . . As a general rule, it can be
said that as soon as the object is actually (not potentially) used for military purposes, or
where its secondary use is military, it is a military objective and may, in principle, be
attacked.”).
109
See supra Part II.A.
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both operationally and legally, specifically with regard to the application of the
principle of proportionality.
Applicable at all times and in all conflicts, proportionality is an essential
component of the protections LOAC provides for civilians, the civilian population
and civilian property in all conflicts, international or non-international. 110 The
principle of proportionality mandates that commanders must refrain from any
attack in which the expected civilian casualties will be excessive in light of the
anticipated military advantage. 111 However, proportionality only applies to attacks
where the commander expects some civilian damage; if there are no civilians or
civilian property at risk from the attack, the proportionality analysis is not
relevant. 112 Even in the case of erstwhile civilian objects used for military
purposes, therefore becoming military objectives by dint of their “use,” if the
object is thus solely military and poses no risk of civilian damage or injury
(without a doubt an unusual proposition in non-international armed conflicts),
proportionality would not arise as a limiting factor on targeting decisions. 113 Dualuse changes the calculus. Every dual-use target poses extensive proportionality
challenges inherent in the process of determining the lawfulness of an attack on
such a target. Even more, “the more interconnected and interdependent societies
become, the greater the reverberating effects of many attacks, and the more
difficult it will be to assess them in advance of an attack.” 114
The second, and perhaps more perplexing, challenge of dual-use targets in
conflicts with non-state actors is how the notion of dual-use should be thought of
in the first place. As described above, dual-use generally refers to objects used for
110

The principle of proportionality is accepted as customary international law in all
types of armed conflicts. See, e.g., Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, supra
note 25 and accompanying text.
111
See Additional Protocol I, supra note 12, art. 51(5)(b).
112
Attacks on military objectives where no civilians are present do not trigger
proportionality obligations. Eric Talbot Jensen, Unexpected Consequences From Knock-On
Effects: A Different Standard for Computer Network Operations?, 18 AM. U. INT’L L. REV.
1145, 1171 (2003). For example, during the Falklands War, the British Navy sunk the
Argentine warship General Belgrano, killing 368 Argentine seamen. Although a large
number of lives were lost, the attack did not pose proportionality concerns because it was a
military vessel, there were no civilians on board and no risk of damage to civilian life or
property. See GARY D. SOLIS, THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT: INTERNATIONAL
HUMANITARIAN LAW IN WAR 280 (2010).
113
In reality, such a situation is of course highly unlikely in conflicts with non-state
actors where the extensive intermingling (whether incidental or purposeful) of military and
civilian objects and personnel puts civilians at risk at almost all times and in almost all
situations. However, as a legal matter, this remains nonetheless true.
114
Michael N. Schmitt, Remarks Before the Carnegie Council for Ethics and
International Affairs: Ethics and Military Force: The Jus in Bello (Jan. 7, 2002), available
at http://www.carnegiecouncil.org/studio/multimedia/20020107/index.html (emphasizing
the need to take into account not only first order effects, but also second-, third-, and
fourth-order effects when analyzing proportionality obligations, especially in conflicts
taking place within the civilian population).
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both civilian and military purposes; the general understanding is usually that such
objects are civilian in nature and become military objectives because they are also
used for military purposes at the same time. Surely this approach holds true for
railroads, interstates, communications networks, broadcast stations, electrical grids,
and other similar objects—they are primarily civilian in nature in the “regular
course of business” but are used extensively and with great effectiveness by the
military during conflict. Analyzing the idea of dual-use objects in conflicts with
non-state actors may upend this traditional understanding of dual-use, however.
Rather than starting with the civilian nature of the object and “militarizing” it
through military use, what seems equally to happen in the activities of non-state
armed groups operating in civilian areas is that an object may well be military in
nature and then “civilianized” by the activities and use of the civilian population.
Imagine, for example, a restaurant that the non-state armed group uses as its
primary headquarters; civilians also use the restaurant regularly as a local eatery. Is
this restaurant a civilian object that is being used for military purposes? Or is the
restaurant equivalent to a military base that happens to house civilian families or
have a daycare center? 115 The difference may seem slight, but is consequential: if
the former, then the restaurant is only a military objective if and once it is being
used for military purposes; 116 if the latter, then the building is a military objective,
full-stop, and can be targeted at any time within the parameters of the principles of
proportionality and precautions. 117
This reversal of the concept of dual-use not only changes the analysis of what
objects constitute military objectives, but also contributes to the narrowing of the
criterion of “nature” as a component of the definition of military objective. If
objects that are “civilianized” as in the example above, are considered dual-use
objects, then they would likely not fall within the category of “nature” at all, since
“nature” refers to objects that are intrinsically military. As such, very few objects
in a conflict with a non-state armed group commingled with the civilian population
would ever satisfy the criterion of “nature,” even those objects that might have
115

Note that even though it is a military objective by nature, any commander
attacking such a military base or installation would still need to assess the civilian death or
injury that would result from the attack in accordance with the principle of proportionality
if he or she expected the attack to cause damage to civilians or civilian property.
116
This notion of use is significantly broader than the notion of “for such time as”
used in the formulation of direct participation in hostilities in Article 51(3) of Additional
Protocol I. See Kenneth Watkin, Canada/United States Military Interoperability and
Humanitarian Law Issues: Land Mines, Terrorism, Military Objectives and Targeted
Killing, 15 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 281, 305 (2005) (“An approach that relies on actual
use appears to suggest an ‘unless and for such time’ test for targeting objects that is more
appropriately considered for targeting persons.” (quoting Additional Protocol I, supra note
12, art. 51 para. 3)); BOTHE ET AL., supra note 108, at 324 (stating that civilian objects need
not have a direct connection to hostilities in order to be considered military objectives
under Article 52). However, the notion of “use” is still not as broad as that of “nature.”
117
The same proportionality considerations raised in ICRC, supra note 86, at 19, thus,
of course, apply.
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seemed to on first impression—because as soon as civilians start using the building
or other object for their own purposes, it becomes a dual-use object and therefore
only targetable on the basis of its use or purpose rather than its nature. Since “use”
and “purpose” are inherently more fact-driven and case-specific analyses than
“nature,” this reconfiguration of dual-use contributes substantially to the increasing
complexity of the targeting decision-making process in conflicts with non-state
armed groups.
C. Extraterritorial Non-International Armed Conflicts
Two types of extraterritorial non-international armed conflicts have grabbed
the attention of the international community and added extensively to the discourse
about the law applicable to conflicts with non-state actors in recent years: conflicts
between a State and a non-state actor located on the territory of a neighboring
State, such as the 2006 conflict between Israel and Hezbollah, and conflicts
between a State and a transnational terrorist organization, such as the U.S. conflict
with al-Qaeda and associated terrorist entities. With regard to the instant
discussion, the key factor in such conflicts is the fact that the non-state actor
targets are located in the territory of a sovereign State, one most likely not part of
the conflict. It is important to note that this cross-border aspect does not change the
definition of military objective or the overall legal analysis thereof. Targetability,
in whatever type of conflict, depends only on LOAC and the principles and
obligations set forth in the treaty and customary law. Rather, the cross-border
component of these conflicts introduces considerations from other legal paradigms,
such as jus ad bellum, and additional operational considerations as well.
1. Sovereignty and the Use of Force in Another State’s Territory
LOAC does not address the decision to use force; that is, to go to war.
Irrespective of the lawfulness or unlawfulness of the decision to resort to force,
LOAC regulates the conduct of hostilities and mandates protections for those not
engaged in hostilities. In contrast, jus ad bellum governs the lawfulness of the
resort to force—when a State may use force within the constraints of the United
Nations Charter framework and established legal principles. 118 Article 2(4) of the
U.N. Charter prohibits the use of force by one State against another: “All members
shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against
the territorial integrity or political independence of any [S]tate, or in any other
manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.” 119
International law provides three justifications that effectively rebut this
presumption against the use of force: 1) the consent of the territorial State; 2) the
authorization of the United Nations under Chapter VII of the United Nations
Charter; or 3) individual or collective self-defense in response to an armed
118
119
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attack. 120 The use of force in self-defense must comply with the principles of
necessity, proportionality and immediacy. 121 These three exceptions balance two
key international law principles: respect for state sovereignty and the collective
interests of the international community, including the right to use force in selfdefense. Thus, a State’s right to protect its sovereignty and territorial integrity is a
fundamental aspect of international law and the international system. At the same
time, however, States have an inherent right to protect their legally recognized
individual and collective interests and their nationals from attack. A thorough
analysis of jus ad bellum and how it applies to the use of force against a non-state
armed group across State borders is beyond the scope of this Article. 122
Nonetheless, understanding the relevance of jus ad bellum in such conflicts is
important as a component of the overall targeting process.
Consider the example of targeting the transportation or communications
infrastructure in the neighboring State to prevent the non-state armed group from
using it to coordinate and conduct operations and launch attacks. Israel engaged in
just such attacks during the 2006 conflict with Hezbollah in southern Lebanon,
targeting the main Beirut-Damascus road and other roads “used to transport
terrorists and weapons to the terror organizations operating from Lebanese territory
against civilians in Israel.” 123 The Israel Defense Forces also attacked runways and
fuel tanks at the international airport in Beirut, based on the airport’s role as a
major hub for the transfer of weapons and supplies to Hezbollah. 124 Within the
realm of LOAC, at first blush, the fact that the targets are across a State border
seems to make little difference in the analysis to determine whether the roads and
airport—or other similar targets in other conflicts—constitute military objectives.
Indeed, based on Israel’s explanation for the targeting decisions quoted above, the
roads and airport made an effective contribution to military action and their
destruction offered a definite military advantage. 125
On a practical level, however, one significant difference stands out: the roads
and the airport are the sovereign territory of Lebanon, which was not a party to the
conflict. In an international armed conflict, when targeting the road networks or
120
Article 51 of the U.N. Charter recognizes a State’s inherent right to individual and
collective self-defense when the subject of an armed attack. Article 42 of the U.N. Charter
then allows for military force to be used when authorized by the Security Council. For a
further discussion on the use of force, see Ashley S. Deeks, Consent to the Use of Force
and International Law Supremacy, 54 HARV. INT’L L.J. 1, 32–35 (2013).
121
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122
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principle of jus ad bellum applicable to the Israel-Hezbollah conflict in 2006).
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airports or other infrastructure, the attacking force is targeting the infrastructure of
the enemy party. In an internal conflict, the State would be targeting what is
essentially its own infrastructure in an attempt to deny the non-state armed group
access to communications or transportation networks and hubs. Sovereignty does
not play a role in either of those situations. In the cross-border conflict with a nonstate armed group, sovereignty and territorial considerations are an inherent
component of any decision-making process, at two levels.
First, although roads and airfields and other infrastructure would likely fall
within the “nature” criterion of the definition of military objective in an
international armed conflict, as suggested by the 1956 ICRC list and other
compilations of military objectives, in the instant example of a cross-border
conflict with a non-state armed group, they would not—precisely for the territorial
and sovereignty reasons noted above. Instead, the analysis would center on “use”
or “purpose” and, in most cases, just as in the conflict between Israel and
Hezbollah, the intended targets would fall within either of those criteria and
constitute lawful military objectives. This difference lies solely at the legal
analytical level and not at the operational level, naturally, but highlights that the
analysis would be significantly more fact-specific and situation-dependent because
of the need to identify actual use or purpose. Second, sovereignty and territorial
considerations are particularly relevant at the operational and strategic level, as one
component of the vast range of considerations that inform such decisions. 126 The
risk or likelihood of drawing the territorial State into the existing conflict with the
non-state armed group would, at least in many situations, be an important strategic
consideration in the decision-making process regarding infrastructure and like
targets in the territorial State, even though they fall squarely within the definition
of military objective. More closely related to jus ad bellum considerations, the
attacking State would likely also want to assess the implications with regard to
international legitimacy and the reaction of the international community, another
important strategic aspect in today’s conflicts.
2. Communicative Targeting
LOAC flatly prohibits direct targeting of civilians and civilian objects. 127
Targeting aimed solely at civilian morale—in other words, targeting objects that do
not qualify as military objectives but are symbolic or notional targets—is also

126

In U.S. military doctrine, targeting rests on the components represented in the
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forbidden. 128 However, the fact that the destruction of a lawful military objective
will have the secondary consequence of undermining civilian morale or support for
the enemy’s war effort does not make an otherwise lawful target no longer lawful.
The essential analysis is whether the target meets the standard set forth in Article
52(2) of Additional Protocol I. 129 In Operation Allied Force, the NATO campaign
to stop Serbian ethnic cleansing in Kosovo, and in U.S. operations in Iraq,
communicative targeting played an important role: one of the central goals of the
operations was to force the other side to stop its conduct. 130 In an international
armed conflict, this form of communicative targeting, sometimes also called
compellance campaigns or coercive campaigns, can be quite effective at reducing
the enemy’s will to fight and bringing the enemy leadership to the negotiating
table. 131
The operational considerations for communicative targeting can differ
dramatically in conflicts with non-state armed groups, in contrast. Legally, the
analysis remains the same: if the target is a legitimate military objective, the fact
that its destruction also offers the benefit of undermining civilian morale does not
change the lawfulness of the target.132 The practical issues in most conflicts with
non-state armed groups, however, are those dominant in counterinsurgency
128
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operations—the need to win the “hearts and minds” of the population. 133 Such
demands may well produce entirely opposite or at least different considerations
with regard to the effects of targeting certain military objectives. Cross-border
conflicts or conflicts with transnational terrorist organizations, in which targeting
may take place in more than one State, increase these practical considerations
exponentially. The civilian population in the territorial State in such conflicts may
play one of many roles: supportive of the non-state armed group, indifferent to the
conflict, opposed to the armed group but unable to challenge its presence or
operations, or opposed to the armed group and eager to challenge its presence and
operations with the requisite support, as just some examples. The impact of
communicative targeting in each of these different scenarios can be dramatically
different and have divergent consequences for the success of the overall operation.
These concerns are taken into account at the operational decision-making level, as
part of the METT-TC analysis noted above, 134 and do not affect the legal analysis
of whether certain targets constitute military objectives. Nonetheless, highlighting
the differences inherent in conflicts with non-state armed groups, and between
different types of conflicts with non-state armed groups, is a useful component of
understanding the entirety of the targeting process in conflicts with non-state
actors.
IV. CONCLUSION
The challenges of identifying targets—whether persons or objects—in
conflicts with non-state actors are not likely to disappear or diminish anytime in
the near future. In fact, the success that non-state armed groups have had at
commingling with the civilian population and making identification of targets
more difficult will only increase those challenges in the future. 135 And yet, the
extensive discourse on the identification and classification of persons in conflicts
with non-state actors—whether internal counterinsurgencies or transnational
conflicts with terrorist groups—has not been matched by corresponding debate and
discussion of the challenges inherent in the identification of objects as legitimate
targets of attack in those same conflicts. Protecting civilians and minimizing the
harm to civilians and the civilian population during conflict is not only achieved by
avoiding attacks on civilian persons, however, but also by maximizing the ability
to distinguish between military and civilian objects. Understanding the
complexities of that latter determination in the extraordinarily complicated
environment of non-international armed conflict can thus help enhance effective
133
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interpretation and application of the definition of military objective and the
concomitant obligations under LOAC.
This Article highlights several such complexities and raises questions for
further analysis and consideration. First, the criterion of “nature” is significantly
narrower as applied to potential targets on the non-state actor side of the conflict,
and in some cases, could disappear almost entirely as nearly every object can only
be classified on the basis of its use rather than its inherent military nature.
Although this shift in the application of the various criteria in the definition of
military objective does not—in most cases—impact the operational
implementation of the definition, because most objects that would be military
objectives would simply fit within a different criterion, it is highly relevant to the
overall understanding of the definition of military objective. No less, it is
important to explore where the narrowing of the concept of “nature” can change
how the definition of military objective is operationalized, such as in cross-border
conflicts or other scenarios complicated by additional considerations. Second,
examples from current and past non-international armed conflicts raise the
question of whether all objects are dual-use. In international armed conflict,
although there are many dual-use targets, a large number of objects fall squarely
within the category of military by nature and do not introduce the additional
complexities of dual-use targets. Dual-use in conflicts with non-state actors may
well be yet more complicated, however, because of the potential reversal of our
traditional understanding of what dual-use means. Whereas dual-use has generally
been thought of as civilian objects that are also used for military purposes at the
same time—that is, civilian objects that are “militarized”—a look at how non-state
armed groups operate and enmesh themselves within the civilian population
suggests that dual-use in such conflicts actually involves “civilianizing” what seem
to be initially military buildings or objects. This reversal can have significant
consequences for not only the analysis of dual-use targets itself, but also for our
understanding of the criterion of “nature” in such conflicts. Finally, the territorial
and sovereignty issues that arise in cross-border and transnational conflicts add
comprehensive operational and strategic considerations to the targeting decisionmaking process.
Identification of military objectives is essential to both effective and lawful
military operations. It is important therefore to broaden the debate about the
identification and classification of persons as legitimate targets of attack—positive
identification, as it is known operationally—to include a more sophisticated and
comprehensive analysis of how different types of non-international armed
conflicts, and the activities of the non-state armed groups fighting in such conflicts,
impact how we apply and understand the definition of military objective.

